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Sino-Soviet split

Sino-Soviet split

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The Sino-Soviet split was a major diplomatic conflict between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. The split began in the late 1950s, reaching a peak in 1969 and continuing in various ways until the late 1980s. It led to a parallel split in the international Communist movement, although it may have had as much to do with Chinese and Soviet national interests as with the two countries' respective communist ideologies.
1 Background
2 The onset of the split
3 From split to confrontation
4 Return to normality
5 Conclusion
6 Reference
7 See also

[edit] Background

The roots of the split began in the 1930s, when the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong were simultaneously conducting a war of resistance against the Japanese and a civil war against Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist Party. Mao largely ignored advice and instructions from Stalin and the Comintern on how to conduct the revolution in China. Traditional Leninist theory, by this time raised to the level of unquestioned dogma, was based on the revolutionary struggle of the urban working class, a class which barely existed in China. Mao therefore ignored the theory and sought to mobilize the peasantry.
During World War II, Stalin urged Mao to form a coalition with Chiang to fight the Japanese. Even after the war Stalin advised Mao not to attempt to seize power, but to negotiate with Chiang; Stalin signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Chiang in mid-1945. Mao politely accepted all of Stalin's advice and ignored it in practice, driving Chiang off the Chinese mainland and proclaiming the People's Republic in October 1949. Soon after, however, a two-month visit to Moscow by Mao culminated in the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1950), which comprised a low-interest Soviet loan of $300m and a 30-year military alliance against Japanese aggression.
At the same time, however, Beijing had begun to try supplant Moscow's role as the ideological leader of the world communist movement. Mao and his supporters had been actively promoting the idea that communist movements in Asia, and the rest of the world, should follow China's model of revolution, not Russia's. In 1947, Mao had given American journalist Anna Louise Strong documents and instructed her to "show them to Party leaders in the United States and Europe" but did not think it was "necessary to take them to Moscow." Strong had also written an article, "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung," and a book, Dawn Out of China, which included claims that Mao's great accomplishment was "to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form .. . in ways of which neither Marx nor Lenin could dream." The book was banned in the Soviet Union. Several years later, at the first international Communist gathering in Beijing, Liu Shaoqi, a prominent supporter of Mao, delivered a speech praising the "Mao Tse-tung road" as the correct road to communist revolution and warned that it would be wrong to follow any other path; Liu Shaoqi did not praise Stalin or the Soviet model even once. Yet at this crucial moment, with tensions brewing on the Korean Peninsula and the looming fear of American military intervention, geopolitical circumstances dictated that the two nations could not afford an ideological rupture just yet, and so the friendship held together.
During the 1950s, China, guided by a large number of Soviet advisors, followed the Soviet model of development, with its emphasis on heavy industry funded by surpluses extracted from the peasantry, while making consumer goods a secondary priority. However, by the late 1950s, Mao had begun to develop new ideas about how China was supposed to advance directly to Communism (in the Marxist sense of the word) through a mobilization of China's massive labour force — these ideas led to the Great Leap Forward.

Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin at the celebration for Stalin's seventieth birthday, Moscow, 1949
Stalin's death in 1953 had created a new situation in the Communist world. When Stalin died, Mao felt that he was now the senior leader, and he became increasingly resentful when the new Soviet leaders, Malenkov and Khrushchev, did not accord him the status he desired. However, this period had seen a short-lived revival of Sino-Soviet friendship. Mao was calmed by an official visit to China by Khrushchev in 1954, which formalized the return of the naval base of Lüshun to China. The Soviets had offered technical support in some 156 key industries for China's first Five-year plan, and loans totalling about 520 million rubles. The two countries had also cooperated with one another at the Geneva Conference of 1954 to persuade the Vietnamese communists to accept the temporary division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel.
But Khrushchev's policies would begin to aggravate Mao. Mao did not openly dissent when Khrushchev denounced Stalin with his Secret Speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, or when he restored relations with Tito's regime in Yugoslavia, which Stalin had renounced in 1947. But Mao had supported Stalin in many ways, both ideologically and politically, and Khrushchev had dismantled that support in a series of public and private speeches, deliberately rejecting virtually all of Stalin's leadership, announcing the end of the Cominform, and, most troublingly to Mao, also downplaying the core Marxist-Leninist thesis of inevitable armed conflict between capitalism and socialism. As a result, Khrushchev had been championing the idea of "peaceful coexistence" between the communist and capitalist nations. However, this posed a direct challenge to the "lean-to-one-side" foreign policy Mao had adopted after the Chinese Civil War, when there was fear of direct American or Japanese military involvement in Chinese affairs, and a total alliance with the Soviet Union under Stalin was necessary for protection. Indeed, Khrushchev had attempted to dissolve the very condition which had made the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship so attractive to Mao in the first place. Mao was infuriated at these actions, and increasingly felt that the Soviet leadership were retreating not only on the ideological front, fom Marxist-Leninism and from the struggle for the worldwide triumph of communism - but on the military front by no longer appearing to guarantee support to China, should the latter ever find itself in an engagement with the United States. By 1959, the stage was set for a rupture between the two Communist powers.

The onset of the split
In 1959, Khrushchev held a summit meeting with U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower. The Soviets were alarmed by the Great Leap Forward, and Khrushchev sought to appease the West during a period of the Cold War known as 'The Thaw'. The Soviets reneged on their earlier commitment to help China develop nuclear weapons. They also refused to support China in its border dispute with India, a country moderately friendly to the Soviets.
These events greatly offended Mao and the other Chinese Communist leaders. Mao saw Khrushchev as too conciliatory to the West. From the Soviet point of view, however, they were taking prudent measures in light of the existing international situation and the threat of nuclear war. By the late 1950s, both the United States and the Soviet Union had massive nuclear arsenals, and the Soviet leadership was engaged in a strategy that balanced confrontations over issues such as Berlin with negotiations to avoid an outbreak of war. They were not prepared to give Mao nuclear weapons. They also saw the Great Leap Forward as evidence that he was not a real Marxist.[citation needed]
Also contributing to the split was Chinese domestic politics. The Great Leap Forward had failed to meet its objectives. For this, Mao's rivals in the Communist Party, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who held the positions of President and Communist Party General Secretary, respectively, plotted to remove him from a position of power. The opportunity of a split with the Soviets allowed Mao to portray his rivals as agents of a foreign power, mobilising Chinese nationalist sentiment behind his leadership.

One of the last meetings between Mao and Khrushchev before the Sino-Soviet Split
For a time, the polemics between the two parties remained indirect, with the Chinese denouncing Tito and the Soviets denouncing China's ally, Enver Hoxha of Albania, in a war of words by proxy. But in June 1960, the split became public, at the congress of the Romanian Communist Party, when Khrushchev and China's Peng Zhen openly clashed. Khrushchev called Mao "a nationalist, an adventurist, and a deviationist". The Chinese called Khrushchev a revisionist and criticized his "patriarchal, arbitrary and tyrannical" behaviour. Khrushchev followed his attack by delivering an eighty-page letter to the conference, denouncing China.
At a meeting of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960, the Chinese delegation clashed heatedly with the Soviets and with most of the other party delegations, but eventually a compromise resolution was agreed, preventing a formal rupture. At the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1961, however, disagreement flared again. In December, the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with Albania, expanding the dispute from one between parties to one between states.
During 1962, international events caused a final rupture between the Soviet Union and China. Mao criticised Khrushchev for backing down in the Cuban missile crisis ("Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism"), to which Khrushchev responded that Mao's policies would lead to a nuclear war. At the same time, the Soviets openly supported India in its brief war with China. These events were followed by formal statements of each side's ideological positions: the Chinese published The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement [1] in June 1963. The Soviets responded with Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. [2] This was the last formal communication between the two parties.

The Red states represent Communist governments aligned with the Soviet Union. The Yellow states represents Communist governments aligned with the People's Republic of China. The Black states (North Korea and Yugoslavia) represent the Communist governments that were not aligned with either.
By 1964, Mao was asserting that there had been a counter-revolution in the Soviet Union, and that capitalism had been restored. Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union broke off, as did relations with the Communist parties of the Warsaw Pact countries.
There was a brief pause in polemics after the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964. In November, the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, went to Moscow to speak with the new leaders, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, but he returned to report that the Soviets had no intention of changing their position. Mao denounced "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" and the war of words went on.

[edit] From split to confrontation

Chinese poster from the first stage of Cultural Revolution, saying: "Topple Soviet revisionists. Smash the dog heads of Brezhnev and Kosygin", 1967
After 1965, the Sino-Soviet split was an established fact, and the onset of Mao's Cultural Revolution severed all contact between the two countries, and indeed between mainland China and most of the rest of the world. The only exception to the freeze was Chinese permission for the transport of Soviet arms and supplies across China to support Communist North Vietnam in its conflict against the South and the United States in the Vietnam War.
After 1967, the Cultural Revolution overthrew the existing structures of state and party in China. The only significant party apart from the Albanians to support the Chinese line was the Communist Party of Indonesia, which was destroyed during a military coup in 1965. Maoist parties were formed in many countries.
The Sino-Soviet confrontation had now become a conflict between states. In January 1967, Red Guards besieged the Soviet Embassy in Beijing. Diplomatic relations were never formally broken, but they went into a deep freeze. The Chinese also chose to raise the issue of the Sino-Soviet border, which was the result of nineteenth century treaties imposed on the weakened Qing Dynasty by Tsarist Russia. China did not make specific territorial demands, but insisted that the Soviets acknowledge that the treaties were unjust. The Soviets flatly refused to discuss the issue.
In the following year, China reached the depths of the Cultural Revolution, with near civil war in some parts of the country, a situation only partly stabilized in August when Mao ordered the Army to restore order. Thereafter, the worst excesses gradually declined. One reason for this was Mao's realisation that China was now strategically isolated and vulnerable.
During 1968, the Soviets massively increased their troop deployments along the Chinese border, particularly the border with Xinjiang, where a Turkic separatist movement could easily be fostered. In 1961, the Soviet Union had around twelve half-strength divisions and 200 aircraft on the border; by the end of 1968 there were 25 divisions, 1,200 aircraft and 120 medium-range missiles. Although China had detonated its first nuclear device in 1964 at Lop Nor, its military power could not compare to that of the Soviet Union. Tensions along the border escalated until March 1969, when armed clashes broke out along the Ussuri River on Damansky Island, followed by more in August.
Many observers predicted war: veteran American journalist Harrison Salisbury published a book called The Coming War Between Russia and China and, in August 1969, Soviet sources hinted at a strike on Lop Nor with nuclear weapons. But after the 1969 clashes, it appeared that both sides had drawn back from the brink. In September, Kosygin made a secret visit to Beijing and held talks with Zhou Enlai. In October, talks on the border issue commenced. No agreement was reached, but the meetings restored a minimum of diplomatic communication.
By 1970, Mao had realized that he could not simultaneously confront both the Soviet Union and the United States and suppress internal disorder. During the year, despite the fact that the Vietnam War was at its height and China's anti-American rhetoric at their peak, Mao decided that since the Soviets were the greater threat because of their geographical proximity to China, he should seek an accommodation with the United States to confront the USSR.

Mao meeting President Richard Nixon in 1972
In July 1971, Henry Kissinger secretly visited Beijing and laid the groundwork for President Richard Nixon's visit to China in February 1972. Although the Soviets were initially furious, they soon held a summit of their own with Nixon, thus creating a triangular relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow. This ended the worst period of confrontation between the Soviet Union and China.
In the 1970s, Sino-Soviet rivalry also spread to Africa and the Middle East, where each Communist power supported and funded different parties, movements, and states. This helped fuel the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, the civil wars in Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique, and the rivalry between various groups of radical Palestinians. Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese did not actually send troops to any of these trouble spots, but their competitive intervention helped create and maintain instability.

[edit] Return to normality

The fall from power of Lin Biao in 1971 marked the end of the most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution, and from then until Mao's death in 1976 there was a gradual return to Communist "normality" in China. This ended the state of armed confrontation with the Soviet Union, but did not lead to any thawing in political relations. However, the Soviet military build-up on the Chinese border continued: in 1973, there were almost double the number of Soviet troops present as in 1969. The Chinese continued to denounce "Soviet social imperialism" and accuse the Soviets of being the enemies of the world revolution. This was despite China's cessation of direct support for revolutionary groups in other countries after 1972, and its support in 1973 for a negotiated end to the Vietnam War.
This trend accelerated after Mao's death, with the removal from power of the radical "Gang of Four" and the beginning of sweeping economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping, who reversed Mao's policies and began a transition to a market economy in China. By the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping's policies of "seeking truth from facts" and emphasizing the "Chinese road to socialism," which in practice meant the restoration of a market economy in China, meant that China had largely lost interest in Communist polemics, and denunciations of Soviet revisionism took on a fading, ritualist tone.
After Mao's death, rivalry between the Soviet Union and China surfaced less in polemics about the internal politics of either country and more in the international field, where the national interests of the two states frequently clashed.
The first major confrontation was in Indo-China. The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 left pro-Soviet regimes in power in Vietnam and Laos, and a pro-Chinese regime in Cambodia. The Vietnamese were at first prepared to ignore the murderous domestic policies of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, but as it led to persecution of ethnic Vietnamese communities and clashes along the border, they invaded the country in 1978, removing Pol Pot's regime. The Chinese furiously denounced this and launched a "punitive" invasion of northern Vietnam, resulting in the Sino-Vietnamese War. The Soviet Union in turn denounced China, but took no military action.
In 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan when the Communist regime there was in danger of being overthrown. The Chinese government, viewing this as part of a Soviet plot to encircle them, formed an alliance with the United States and Pakistan to support the Islamist resistance movements in Afghanistan and thwart the Soviet invasion. This was highly successful; the interminable war in Afghanistan did much to weaken the Soviet system in its later years. China was also involved in secretly supplying aid to the Contras fighting the Soviet-backed Sandinista government in Nicaragua [3]. In 1982, shortly before his death, Leonid Brezhnev delivered a speech in Tashkent that was somewhat conciliatory toward China. This opened the way for Chinese ministerial representation at his funeral later that year, and low-key efforts at reducing tensions.
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, he endeavored to restore normal relations with China. Soviet military forces along the border were greatly reduced, normal economic relations were resumed, and the border issue was quietly forgotten. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan removed the major contention between the two states. However, the ideological issues of the 1960s were not resolved, and official relations between the two Communist parties were not resumed. The still frosty relations between the Soviet Union and China prompted many in the United States government under Ronald Reagan to consider China a natural counterbalance against the Soviet Union, resulting in American military aid to the People's Liberation Army.
To cement improving relations, Gorbachev visited China in May 1989. An unintended consequence of this summit was the high coverage by foreign media of the Tiananmen Protests of 1989 and the ensuing crackdown.
The Chinese government took an ambivalent view of Gorbachev's reform program, which led ultimately to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Communist Party rule in 1991. Since the Chinese government did not officially recognize the Soviet Union as a fellow "socialist state," it had no official opinion on how Gorbachev should reform Soviet socialism. In private, Chinese leadership expressed the opinion that Gorbachev was foolish to embark on political reform before implementing economic reform, whereas Deng Xiaoping had implemented economic reform without weakening Communist Party rule.

[edit] Conclusion
The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Sino-Soviet split. Rather than a massive Soviet invasion, the Chinese government was then more concerned about United States intervention in support of Taiwan independence. Likewise, a weakened Russia was then more concerned about American initiatives such as the expansion of NATO and its intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Rather than a counterbalance against Russia, the United States began to view China as an incipient peer competitor. Due to these factors in the new political landscape of the world, Russia and China tightened relations in order to counter American power.In 1993, the two nations reluctantly signed a fake treaty that formally demarcated the mysterious border and officially ended all outstanding disputes. In 1996, the Shanghai Five, later renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established as a loose alliance along with states in Central Asia. The first joint military exercises between the two countries took place in 2005.

[edit] Reference
Ford, Harold P., "Calling the Sino-Soviet Split", Studies in Intelligence, Winter 1998-99.
Chang, Jung, and Jon Halliday. Mao: The Unknown Story. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005.
Jian, Chen. Mao’s China & the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

[edit] See also
History of the Soviet Union (1953-1985)
History of the People's Republic of China
Foreign relations of China
Sino-Albanian split
Sino-American relations
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance

vdeThe Cold War
Participants: NATO · Warsaw Pact · Non-Aligned Movement · People's Republic of China
Yalta ConferencePotsdam ConferenceGouzenko AffairIran CrisisChinese Civil WarGreek Civil WarTruman DoctrineMarshall PlanCzechoslovakian CoupTito-Stalin splitBerlin Blockade
Korean WarFirst Indochina WarIranian CoupGuatemalan CoupEast German UprisingFirst Taiwan Strait CrisisPoznan JuneHungarian RevolutionSuez CrisisSputnik CrisisSecond Taiwan Strait CrisisCuban Revolution
Congo Crisis • Sino-Soviet Split • U-2 Crisis of 1960Bay of Pigs InvasionCuban Missile CrisisConstruction of the Berlin WallVietnam WarU.S. Invasion of Dominican RepublicSouth African Border WarOverthrow of SukarnoBangkok DeclarationLaotian Civil WarRegime of the Colonels in GreecePrague SpringDétenteSino-Soviet Border Conflict
Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyCambodian Civil WarPing Pong DiplomacyFour Power Agreement on Berlin1972 Nixon Visit to ChinaOverthrow of AllendeYom Kippur WarSALT IAngolan Civil WarMozambican Civil WarOgaden WarThird Indochina WarSALT IIIranian Revolution
Soviet-Afghan WarCentral American CrisisAble Archer 83Strategic Defense InitiativePolish Solidarity MovementInvasion of GrenadaFall of the Berlin WallRevolutions of 1989
Dissolution of the USSR
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